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Abstract
This paper examines per capita pollution in a developing economy by
a family-optimization model where fertility is endogenous and wealth
increases welfare through status effect. Developing countries have
weaker environmental laws and specialize in capital-intensive “dirty”
goods. With a significant status effect, gains from trade stimulate
investments leading to higher wages so that population growth first
increases but then decreases. The opposite changes in labor supply
first swell but then curb the production of the capital-intensive dirty
good. A typical EKC path appears: per capita pollution increase at
the earlier but decrease at the later stages of development.
Journal of Economic Literature: Q56, O41, J13
Keywords: international trade, status, population growth, develop-
ment
Addresses of the Authors: Ulla Lehmijoki, Valkjarventie 13 02130 Espoo,
Finland. (email: Ulla.Lehmijoki@helsinki.fi) – Tapio Palokangas, Depart-
ment of Economics, P.O. Box 17 (Arkadiankatu 7), FIN-00014 University of
Helsinki, Finland. Phone (email: Tapio.Palokangas@helsinki.fi)
1 Introduction
Has trade liberalization any impact on pollution in developing countries?
Will the Environmental Kuznets Curve appear in poor countries? The “pes-
simists” argue that free trade transfers pollution-intensive production from
rich countries to poor countries, whereas the “optimists” claim that gains
from trade help the poor countries to reach the EKC peak, after which
pollution decreases. In this paper, we show that both perspectives are in
some respect correct, but alone insufficient to explain the complicated demo-
graphic, labor market, and environmental dynamics in developing countries,
triggered by the liberalization of trade. Free trade changes labor supply
through population growth which, together with capital accumulation, first
increases but then decreases environmental degradation.
In the earlier literature, Arrow et al. (1995) suggest that the EKC path
arises because in poor countries, people “cannot afford environmental ameni-
ties over material well-being but ... in richer countries people give more atten-
tion to environmental quality”. Selden and Song (1994) and Grossman and
Krueger (1995) argue that EKC may result from the interaction of the scale,
composition, and technology effects, as forces leading to cleaner composition
of goods and techniques outweigh the adverse effects of growing economic
activity. Pasche (2002) and Kelly (2003) claim that since latest vintages of
capital are less pollution intensive, capital accumulation and gradual techni-
cal progress together may decrease emissions. John and Pecchenino (1994)
maintain that poor economies don’t engage environmental investments but
free-ride at the cost of future generations, whereas Stokey (1998) shows that
intergenerational conflict calls for governmental activities for EKC to arise.
In this paper, we concentrate on the demographic and environmental
changes induced by the post-war liberalization of world trade, which in-
creased trade volumes by an annual average that was close to ten per cent
initially and somewhat lower after the oil crises (Maddison 2001). Simulta-
neously, population growth in developing countries accelerated to unprece-
dented numbers to peak around the 1970s and to decrease soon after. The
highest numbers, close to four per cent, were reached in the poorest countries.
Our theory derives of three elements. The first of them is the comparative
advantage in trade. Because pollution-intensive goods are capital-intensive
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as well, the capital-rich industrial countries would have the comparative ad-
vantage in dirty goods with uniform environmental laws,(Cole and Elliot 2003
and 2005). According to the Pollution Havens hypothesis, however, this ad-
vantage is in poor countries because their legislation in terms of environment
is weak (Antweiler et al. 2001, Copeland and Taylor 2004).1 Consequently,
poor countries specialize in the capital-intensive dirty goods (Suri and Chap-
man 1998, Cole and Elliott 2003, Mani and Jha 2006).
The second element is demographic. According to the theory of endoge-
nous fertility (Becker 1981), the demand for children results from two oppos-
ing effects: the income effect and the substitution effect. Because children
are normal goods, the income effect is positive, but because high wages in-
crease the opportunity costs for children, the substitution effect is negative.
With liberalization, these effects operate as follows. In the short run, gains
from trade raise fertility through the income effect. They also generate sav-
ings and capital accumulation, which raise wages and decrease fertility in the
long run (Lehmijoki and Palokangas 2007). This long-run effect, however,
is sensitive to saving incentives in developing countries. If these are low,
gains from trade manifest themselves as long-lasting population growth and
the country stagnates to a high-fertility, low-capital poverty trap (Galor and
Mountford 2006). But if saving incentives are high and capital accumula-
tion gets started, then population growth first increases and then decreases.
Hence, labor supply falls initially with the “migration” of women to child
rearing, but then it rises, as both the grown-up children and their parents
enter the labor force (Bloom and Williamson 1998).
The third element is the Rybczynski theorem: given full employment
of both capital and labor, the initial decrease in labor supply curbs the
labor-intensive clean sector but expands the capital-intensive dirty sector
which, because of the investments, may swell ever more at early stages of
development (Rybczynski 1955). But because capital accumulation attracts
people from home to production through higher wages, labor-intensive clean
sector expands and ultimately crowds out the capital-intensive dirty sector.
This generates a typical EKC path: per capita pollution increases at the
earlier stages of development but decreases at the later stages.
1Several articles on Pollution Havens are collected and reprinted in Fullerton (2006).
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Empirical evidence on trade and pollution is somewhat mixed. Suri and
Chapman (1998) support the pessimistic view by showing that richer coun-
tries have reduced their energy requirements since they import the energy-
intensive goods from poorer countries. Because energy consumption is one
of the main sources of pollution, this has increased pollution in poorer coun-
tries. Mani and Jha (2006) document a considerable shift in Vietnamese
export toward pollution intensive manufacturing goods (leather and textiles)
after the liberalization of trade. On the other hand, Jha et al. (2006) have
carried out case studies in poor countries and they support the optimistic
view that gains from trade will provide enough resources for environmental
protection. A rigorous empirical analysis is outside the scope of this paper
but we provide some anecdotal evidence to test our theory. The main finding
is that trade liberalization induces a peak in population growth that, after a
lag of one generation, is followed by a similar peak in per capita pollution.
Remembering the inverse relationship between population growth and labor
supply, this pattern seems to support our theory.
This study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a family-optimization
model in a small open developing economy in which trade liberalization shows
up as a price increase in its dirty export good. Section 3 constructs the dy-
namics of the model. Short-run and long-run effects are analyzed in Sections
4 and 5 with the result that, after liberalization, per capita pollution first
increases and then decreases. Section 6 discusses the anecdotic evidence and
Section 7 closes the paper.
2 The model
We denote population in the economy by L. Mortality and aging is ignored,
for simplicity, so that the number of newborns is equal to the change of
population L˙ = dL/dt, where (˙) denotes the derivative with respect to time
t. We assume that the rearing of each newborn requires a fixed amount q of
labor. The population growth rate is then given by
n
.
= L˙/L (1)
and the total labor in child rearing by qL˙ = qnL. The labor supply in the
market is then equal to population minus labor in child rearing, L− qnL.
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We assume that the economy consists of two sectors: the dirty sector and
the clean sector with outputs A and B respectively. Kelly (2003) defines
three different measures of pollution: the stock of pollutants, the intensity
of control policy, and emissions. We use emissions, because they can be eas-
ily incorporated into a model of population growth and international trade.
Because emissions must be an increasing function of the output of the dirty
sector, A, we use A as an index of emissions. Both sectors produce their
outputs from labor and capital through Leontief technology:
A = min[Ka/αa, La/βa], B = min[Ka/αa, La/βa],
where A (B) is output, Ka (Kb) capital input and La (Lb) labor input in
the dirty (clean) sector, and αa, αb, βa and βb are constant and positive
production coefficients. This leads to the equilibrium conditions
Ka = αaA, Kb = αbB, La = βaA, Lb = βbB. (2)
We assume that the dirty sector is more capital intensive:
αa/βa = Ka/La > Kb/Lb = αb/βb and αaβb > αbβa. (3)
Capital and labor are freely transferable between the sectors. Noting (2),
this yields
K = Ka +Kb = αaA+ αbB, L− qnL = La + Lb = βaA+ βbB, (4)
where K is capital stock and L − qnL the labor supply in production. We
normalize the output price in the clean sector at unity. Solving for A and B
from (4) yields
A =
βbK − αb(1− qn)L
αaβb − αbβa , B =
αa(1− qn)L− βaK
αaβb − αbβa .
Noting this and (3), the per capita outputs are linear functions
A/L
.
= a(k, n), ak > 0, an > 0, a− ann = a
∣∣
n=0
> 0,
B/L
.
= b(k, n), bk < 0, bn < 0. (5)
where the lower case letters a, b, and k stand for per capita variables and the
subscripts stand for the partial derivatives respectively.
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Because of lax environmental legislation, the developing economy exports
the dirty good. The economy is so small that the (relative) price of the dirty
good, p, is given from abroad. National income per capita is then given by
the function
y(k, n, p) = pa+ b, yk(p)
.
=
∂y
∂k
> 0, yn(p)
.
=
∂y
∂n
< 0, yp
.
=
∂y
∂p
= a. (6)
We assume that the output A of the dirty sector is produced only for
exports, for simplicity. The domestic consumption of this good would com-
plicate the analysis without adding any essential results.
Following Razin and Ben-Zion (1975) and Becker (1981), we consider a
representative family that derives utility from per capita consumption c and
the number of children that can be proxied by population growth n
.
= L˙/L.
Because capital is the only asset in the model, total wealth is equal to capital
K. In addition to consumption and children, the families benefit also from
their status in society. Therefore, following Kurz (1968), Corneo and Jeanne
(1997, 2001), Chang et al. (2000), Pham (2005), Fisher (2005) and Fisher
and Hof (2005), we augment the utility function by inserting the per capita
wealth of the family itself, k
.
= K/L, over and above the average per capita
wealth in the economy, κ. Hence, the representative family’s discounted
utility at time t = 0 is specified as follows:
U =
∫ ∞
0
[
log c+ θ log n+ εv(k − κ)]e−ρtdt, v′ > 0, v′′ < 0, v′(0) = 1,
(7)
where ρ > 0 is the constant rate of time preference, v(k − κ) the proxy for
the status of the family, and θ > 0 and ε > 0 are the constant weights for
children and status respectively.
On the assumption that capital is the only asset in the economy, the fam-
ily budget constraint can be written in terms of its accumulation as follows:
K˙
.
= dK/dt = yL− cL, (8)
where K˙
.
= dK/dt is saving (= capital accumulation), yL total income and
cL total consumption of the family. Noting (5) and (6), the budget constraint
(8) can be expressed in per capita terms as:
k˙ =
K˙
L
− K
L
L˙
L
= y(k, n, p)− c− nk. (9)
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3 Dynamics
Given the behavior of the families, we consider the effects of an exogenous
increase in the relative price p of the dirty good. This results from opening
up trade and the initial specialization of the economy to the capital intensive
dirty good A. We construct the patterns of the capital-labor ratio k and per
capita emissions a.
The representative family maximizes its utility (7) by per capita con-
sumption c and the number of children, n, subject to its budget constraint
(9). The Hamiltonian corresponding to this is given by
H = log c+ θ log n+ εv(k − κ) + λ[y(k, n, p)− c− nk], (10)
where, noting (6), the co-state variable λ evolves according to
λ˙ = ρλ− ∂H
∂k
= [ρ+ n− yk(p)]λ− εv′(k − κ), lim
t→∞
λke−ρt = 0. (11)
Noting (6), the first-order conditions of this maximization are given by
∂H
∂c
=
1
c
− λ = 0, ∂H
∂n
=
θ
n
+ λ[yn(p)− k] = 0. (12)
We replace λ by per capita emissions a as the co-state variable, for con-
venience. Using (5), the population growth rate n can be written as a linear
function
n(k, a), nk
.
= ∂n/∂k < 0, na
.
= ∂n/∂a > 0. (13)
Noting (5), (12) and (13), we obtain per capita consumption c as follows:
c =
1
λ
=
1
θ
z(k, a, p), z(k, a, p)
.
= n(k, a)[k − yn(p)], zk .= ∂z
∂k
= n+
z
n
nk,
za
.
=
∂z
∂a
=
z
n
na > 0, zp
.
=
∂z
∂p
= −n ∂
2y
∂n∂p
= −nan < 0,
a+ zp = a− ann > 0. (14)
An increase in per capita wealth k has two opposite effects on consumption
c = z/θ:
(i) Per capita wealth increases consumption.
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(ii) Because an increase in wealth raises capital and wages, it attracts la-
bor from child rearing to production and the population growth rate
falls. Because children and consumption are complements in prefer-
ences, consumption falls as well.
We assume that the wealth effect (i) dominates over the wage effect (ii), so
that an increase in wealth raises consumption:
zk > 0. (15)
Inserting the functions (13) and (14) into (9), we obtain capital accumu-
lation as a function of (k, a, p) as follows:
k˙ = y(k, n(k, a), p)− z(k, a, p)/θ − n(k, a)k.
This function has following properties:
∂k˙
∂k
= yk + (yn − k)nk − zk
θ
− n = yk −
(
1 +
1
θ
)
zk,
∂k˙
∂a
= (yn − k)na − za
θ
= −
(
1 +
1
θ
)
za < 0,
∂k˙
∂p
= yp − zp
θ
= a− zp
θ
> 0.
(16)
If we assume that all families in the economy are similar, in equilibrium all
families have the same per capita wealth, κ = k. Given κ = k, (7) and (13),
we can transform the differential equation (11) into
ρ+ n(k, a)− yk(p)− ε
θ
z(k, a, p)
= ρ+ n− y1 − ε
λ
v′(0) = λ˙/λ = −z˙/z = −(zk/z)k˙ − (za/z)a˙.
Rearranging terms and noting (6), (14) and (16), we obtain the change of
per capita emissions, a˙, as a function of the variables (n, k, p) as follows:
a˙ =
z
za
[
ε
θ
z(k, a, p) + yk(p)− n(k, a)− ρ
]
− zk
za
k˙
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with
∂a˙
∂p
∣∣∣∣
k˙=a˙=0
=
z
za
[
ε
θ
zp + ak
]
− zk
za
∂k˙
∂p
=
z
za
[
ε
θ
zp + ak
]
− zk
za
[
a− ε
θ
zp
ε
]
,
lim
(θ/ε)→0
∂a˙
∂p
∣∣∣∣
k˙=a˙=0
=
( z
za
+
zk
εza
)ε
θ
zp < 0,
∂a˙
∂k
∣∣∣∣
k˙=a˙=0
=
z
za
[
ε
θ
zk − nk
]
− zk
za
∂k˙
∂k
=
z
za
[
ε
θ
zk − nk
]
− zk
za
[
yk −
(
1 +
1
ε
ε
θ
)
zk
]
,
∂a˙
∂a
∣∣∣∣
k˙=a˙=0
=
z
za
[
ε
θ
za − na
]
− zk
za
∂k˙
∂a
=
z
za
[
ε
θ
za − na
]
+
(
1 +
1
ε
ε
θ
)
zk,
lim
(θ/ε)→0
∂a˙
∂k
∣∣∣∣
k˙=a˙=0
=
(
1 +
zk
εz
) z
za
ε
θ
zk > 0, lim
(θ/ε)→0
∂a˙
∂a
∣∣∣∣
k˙=a˙=0
=
(
1 +
zk
εz
)
z
ε
θ
> 0.
(17)
4 Long-run effects of trade liberalization
To obtain the long-run changes of k and a due to an increase in p, we linearize
the system in the neighborhood of the steady state k˙ = a˙ = 0:(
∂k˙/∂k ∂k˙/∂a
∂a˙/∂k ∂a˙/∂a
)(
dk
da
)
+
(
∂k˙/∂p
∂a˙/∂p
)
dp = 0, (18)
where the Jacobian J is negative by the saddle point condition:
∂k˙
∂k
∂a˙
∂a
<
∂k˙
∂a
∂a˙
∂k
. (19)
From J < 0, (14), (16), (17) and (18) it follows that
dk
dp
= − 1J
∣∣∣∣∣ ∂k˙∂p ∂k˙∂a∂a˙
∂p
∂a˙
∂a
∣∣∣∣∣ = − 1J
∣∣∣∣∣ ∂k˙∂p ∂k˙∂az
za
[
ε
θ
zp + ak
]− zk
za
∂k˙
∂p
z
za
[
ε
θ
za − na
]− zk
za
∂k˙
∂a
∣∣∣∣∣
= − 1J
z
za
∣∣∣∣∣ ∂k˙∂p ∂k˙∂aε
θ
zp + ak
ε
θ
za − na
∣∣∣∣∣ = − 1J zza
∣∣∣∣ a− εθ zpε −(1 + εθ 1ε)zaε
θ
zp + ak
ε
θ
za − na
∣∣∣∣ ,
da
dp
= − 1J
∣∣∣∣∣ ∂k˙∂k ∂k˙∂p∂a˙
∂k
∂a˙
∂p
∣∣∣∣∣ = − 1J
∣∣∣∣∣ ∂k˙∂k ∂k˙∂pz
za
[
ε
θ
zk − nk
]− zk
za
∂k˙
∂k
z
za
[
ε
θ
zp + ak
]− zk
za
∂k˙
∂p
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
= − 1J
z
za
∣∣∣∣∣ ∂k˙∂k ∂k˙∂pε
θ
zk − nk εθzp + ak
∣∣∣∣∣ = − 1J zza
∣∣∣∣ yk − (1 + 1ε εθ)zk a− εθ zpεε
θ
zk − nk εθzp + ak
∣∣∣∣ ,
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lim
(θ/ε)→0
dk
dp
= − 1J
z
za
lim
(θ/ε)→0
∣∣∣∣ a− εθ zpε −(1 + εθ 1ε)zaε
θ
zp + ak
ε
θ
za − na
∣∣∣∣
= − 1J
z
za
ε
θ
∣∣∣∣ a− εθ zpε −(1 + εθ 1ε)zazp za
∣∣∣∣ = − zJ εθ
∣∣∣∣ a −1zp 1
∣∣∣∣
= − zεJ θ (a+ zp) > 0,
lim
(θ/ε)→0
da
dp
= − 1J
z
za
lim
(θ/ε)→0
∣∣∣∣ yk − (1 + 1ε εθ)zk a− εθ zpεε
θ
zk − nk εθzp + ak
∣∣∣∣
= − 1J
z
za
ε
θ
∣∣∣∣ yk − (1 + 1ε εθ)zk a− εθ zpεzk zp
∣∣∣∣ = − 1J zza εθ
∣∣∣∣ yk − zk azk zp
∣∣∣∣
= − 1J
z
za
ε
θ
∣∣∣∣ yk a+ zpzk zp
∣∣∣∣ = − 1J zza εθ
∣∣∣∣ + ++ −
∣∣∣∣ < 0.
This result can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 1 If status is significant relative to the number of children (e.g.
if θ/ε is small enough), then trade liberalization will increase capital k and
decrease per capita emissions a in the long run.
A considerable share of the gains from trade is invested only if the role of
status is large. For the rest of the study, we assume that θ/ε is small enough
to generate this behaviour.
5 Short-run effects of trade liberalization
Given (16), (17) and (19), it is true for small enough θ/ε that
∂k˙
∂a
< 0,
∂a˙
∂a
> 0,
∂a˙
∂k
> 0,
∂k˙
∂k
∂a˙
∂a︸︷︷︸
+
<
∂k˙
∂a︸︷︷︸
−
∂a˙
∂k︸︷︷︸
+
< 0,
∂k˙
∂k
< 0. (20)
This implies that both singular curves (k˙ = 0) and (a˙ = 0) are decreasing,
but the curve (k˙ = 0) falls steeper than the curve (a˙ = 0) [see Fig. 1],
∂n
∂k
∣∣∣∣
k˙=0
= − ∂k˙
∂k
/
∂k˙
∂a
< − ∂a˙
∂k
/
∂a˙
∂a
=
∂a
∂k
∣∣∣∣
a˙=0
< 0.
Given (16), (17) and (18), the comparative dynamic properties of the
system in the (k, a)-plane are the following. Assume first that the system is
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ka
a  *
 k = 0
.
S
S
.
 a = 0
.
k *
Figure 1: The saddle point
initially in the steady state (k∗0, a
∗
0). Once the price p increases, the steady
state moves to (k∗1, a
∗
1). Noting (16), (17) and (20), we obtain that both
curves (k˙ = 0) and (a˙ = 0) shift to the right [Fig. 2]:
∂k
∂p
∣∣∣∣
k˙=0
= − ∂k˙
∂p︸︷︷︸
+
/
∂k˙
∂k︸︷︷︸
−
> 0,
∂k
∂p
∣∣∣∣
a˙=0
= − ∂a˙
∂p︸︷︷︸
−
/
∂a˙
∂k︸︷︷︸
+
> 0. (21)
Given proposition 1, the capital-labor ratio k rises but emissions a fall in the
long run, k∗0 < k
∗
1 and a
∗
0 > a
∗
1. From (17) it follows that when p increases,
the co-state variable n may jump upwards from a0 to aˆ [Fig. 2].
2 After this,
the system evolves along the saddle path SS to the new steady state (k1, a1).
Thus, the increase in p may raise a in the short run.
Proposition 2 Trade liberalization (i.e., a higher p) may increase per capita
emissions a in the short run, but it definitely decreases these in the long run.
2At the theoretical level, we cannot fully eliminate the possibility that a jumps down-
wards. In such a case, total saving increases so much that the family consumes less
children also in the short run. Because we didn’t find any developing country that would
have followed such development patterns, we left that case out of Fig. 3.
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k 1*k 0*
a  ^
Figure 2: The dynamics of the model
To comprehend these results, consider the effect of the the gains from
trade (i.e., a higher export price p) and the role of the Rybczynski theo-
rem. Initially, both the capital stock K and population L are constant while
population growth n increases because gains from trade induce an income
effect raising the demand for children. Therefore, labor supply L− qnL de-
creases as people withdraw from production. Hence, per capita capital stock
k = K/L is constant but the capital-labor ratio in production,K/(L−qnL) =
k/(1 − qn), increases. This leads to expansion of the capital-intensive dirty
sector and per capita emissions a = A/L increase from a∗o to aˆ [Fig. 2].
In the long run, gains from trade stimulate savings and per capita capital
stock k raises from k∗0 to k
∗
1 [Fig. 2]. As the capital accumulation starts, the
capital-labor ratio in production, K/(L− qnL) = k/(1− qn) increases, lead-
ing to an increase in wages. With higher wages, people choose to have fewer
children, the population growth rate n decreases, people re-enter the labor
force and the capital-labor ratio in production, K/(L − qnL) = k/(1 − qn)
decreases again, falling ultimately below its original level. This downsizes
the capital-intensive dirty sector and decreases per capita emissions a from
aˆ to a∗1. Obviously, the swelling labor force put wages in pressure but capital
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accumulation is capable to more than offset this pressure. Hence, population
keeps decreasing and may ultimately fall below its post-trade level.
6 Some anecdotal evidence
Has there been any impact of trade liberalization on per capita pollution in
developing countries? The model above argues that, in the short run, trade
liberalization increases population growth and decreases the labor supply. By
the Rybczynski theorem, this expands the capital intensive dirty sector. In
the long run, capital accumulation decreases population growth and increases
labor supply as parents re-enter the labor force together with their grown-up
children. This curbs the dirty sector and a typical EKC path appears.
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Year
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
Populatiom						      CO2 emissions pc,
Growth %						      Metric tons
Population Growth
Emissions
Figure 3: Population growth and per capita pollution measured as per capita
CO2 emissions in the Low and Middle Income Countries. Source: World
Bank 2007
Consider now the post-war history of population and pollution in de-
veloping countries (Low and Middle Income Countries in the World Bank
classification, Figure 3). This shows a fast increase in population growth
toward the end of 1960s and a rapid decline soon after. On the other hand,
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the per capita pollution, measured as CO2 emissions, peaked approximately
one generation later, as predicted by the model.
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Year
10
20
30
40
50
60
TradeL% of GDP
Low and Middle 
Income Countries
Least Developed
Countries
Panel a									 Panel b
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Year
0
10
20
Savings (% of GDP)
Least Developed
Countries
Low and Middle 
Income Countries
Figure 4: Trade and savings in the Least Developed Countries and in the
Middle Income Countries. Source: World Bank 2007
The model above claims that the EKC path is conditional to capital
appreciation, i.e., to the status effect. If this effect is weak, gains from trade
generate population growth, there is no take-off of investments, and income
is low. This, indeed, has been the typical pattern in the Least Developing
Countries, where high population growth continued until 1990s, and where
the per capita pollution peak is not reached yet. Panel a in Figure 4, how-
ever, shows that the Least Developed Countries have not been closed. On
the contrary, their trade was initially higher than that in the developing
countries on the average but domestic savings have been exceptionally low
[Figure 4, panel b] and gains from trade have mainly manifested themselves
as demographic growth. These countries have not yet reached the phase in
which population growth decreases, labor supply swells, and pollution de-
creases. The status effect, therefore, may have played a considerable role in
the EKC patterns of developing countries.
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7 Conclusions
This paper examines per capita pollution in a developing economy by a
family-optimization model where children are normal goods in preferences
and wealth, as the proxy for status, has a positive effect on welfare. Although
developing economies are capital poor, we assume that trade liberalization
increases their specialization in the capital intensive dirty good because of
lax environmental laws in these countries.
Trade liberalization raises the relative price for exports and generates
gains from trade. The outcome of this depends on the significance of the
status effect. When this effect is weak, families spend the gains from trade
mainly in the consumption of goods and children. This leads to persistent
stagnation in investment and long-lasting population growth. When the
status effect is strong, a considerable share of the gains from trade is invested.
In such a case, population growth first increases but then decreases leading
to opposite changes in labor supply. The Rybczynski theorem then indicates
that the capital-intensive dirty sector first expands and crowds out the labor-
intensive clean sector but ultimately this development pattern is reversed.
Consequently, a typical EKC path is obtained: per capita pollution increases
at the earlier but decrease at the later stages of development.
This paper concentrates on the EKC, i.e., on the per capita pollution.
We argue that per capita pollution decreases below its original level in the
long run. The total pollution, however, is of the ultimate interest, at least in
those cases where the pollutant is a public good, common to all inhabitants.
In spite of the decrease in the per capita pollution, total pollution increases
if the decrease of the per capita pollution does not outweigh the still ongoing
population growth. Therefore, one may ask which effect trade liberalization
has on total pollution. In the presence of the status effect, trade stimulates
capital accumulation and rises wages. If this mechanism is strong, population
growth may fall below its post-trade level. Hence, it seems likely that trade
liberalization also has a favorable effect on the total pollution. Therefore,
those developing countries that exercise restrictive trade policies or fail to
support domestic savings may be the worst polluters in the future.
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